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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
A.K. & R. WHIPPLE PLUMBING 
AND HEATING, 
Plaintiff/Appellee. 
Vb. 
THOMAS D. GUY and ASPEN 
CONSTRUCTION, a Utah corporation, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
: Priority No. 15 
No.20001009-CA 
Trial Court Case: 
940300014 CN 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Appeal from an Order of the 
Third Judicial District Court 
Summit County, Utah 
The Honorable Frank G. Noel, Presiding 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78-2-2(4), Utah Code Annotated, the Utah Supreme Court transferred this 
matter to the Utah Court of Appeals for disposition. 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Was it patent error or did the trial Court abuse its discretion in refusing to grant 
either Whipple or Defendants their attorney fees related to the 77 Thaynes Canyon 
property after ruling that Defendants, after deducting the HVAC portion of Whipple's 
1 
claim, were entitled to a money judgment of $527.00, however, upon factoring in 
Whipple's successful defense of Defendant's Counterclaim, Whipple had a net 
advantage of $24,473.00. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: "The Standard of Review on appeal of the 
reasonableness of a trial court's award of attorney fees is patent error or clear abuse of 
discretion." Faust v. Kai Technologies. Inc., 15 P.3d 1266 (Utah 2000)1 
CITATION TO RECORD WHERE ISSUE PRESERVED: Defendants' 
Memorandum of Points and Authority in Support of Defendants' Request for Attorney 
Fees filed November 2, 1999, Record 1975; Notice of Appeal filed November 17, 2000, 
Record 2050. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULE 
Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18: 
§38-1-18. Attorney's Fees. Except as provided in 
§38-11-107, in any action brought to enforce any lien 
under this chapter the successful party shall be entitled 
to recover a reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by 
the court, which shall be taxed as costs in the action. 
Amended by Laws 1961, c. 76; Laws 1995, c. 172, § 4, 
eff. May 1,1995. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1
 Defendant incorrectly characterizes the issue as being the trial court having incorrectly 
interpreted Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18 by denying to award Defendants their attorney fees, 
rather the issue concerns the reasonableness of the fees awarded or in this case not awarded. 
There is nothing in the record suggesting the trial court ruled that fees are not recoverable as 
claimed by Defendants therefore the standard of review is "abuse of discretion" not "review for 
correctness without deference to the lower court's conclusions." 
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A. NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal is from the final judgment (on 
remand from the Utah Court of Appeals) of the Third District Court, Summit County, 
which, after calculating Defendants' offset for the HVAC system towards Whipple's 
damage award of $20,273.00, denied Whipple's claim for relief of foreclosure of its 
$30,647.20 mechanic's lien,2 entered a judgment against Whipple in the amount of 
$527.00, however, because Defendants' monetary recovery was negligible and they lost 
their Counterclaim, the trial court considered the outcome "a draw" and declined to 
award Defendants their attorney fees. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN COURT 
BELOW: 
Following an appeal (first appeal) by the Defendants (homeowner and general 
contractor), the Utah Court of Appeals entered an order remanding the matter to the trial 
court for disposition consistent with its opinion. A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & 
Heating v. Aspen Construction. 977 P.2d 518, 527 (Utah App. 1999). After remand, the 
trial court held a telephone conference with the attorneys and set deadlines to submit 
memoranda as to the remaining issues identified by the Utah Court of Appeals for 
resolution by the Trial Court. The trial court held a hearing on November 10, 1999, at 
which time the trial court heard arguments and took evidence (by way of affidavit) as to 
the reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the parties. On January 20, 2000, the trial 
2
 See Addendum "1"- Whipple's Notice of Claim of Lien filed September 14, 1993. 
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court entered its Memorandum Decision as to the remaining issues - Record 2022. The 
trial court, after calculating the offset for the HVAC system towards Whipple's recovery 
entered a money judgment in favor of the homeowner and Aspen and against Whipple in 
the amount of $527.00. The trial court declined to award either party their reasonable 
attorney fees based upon an analysis which, while resulting in a monetary award to 
Defendants of $527.00, actually calculated a net advantage to Whipple in the amount of 
$24,473.00. Based thereon, the Court was of the opinion that the outcome was 
essentially "a draw" and concluded neither party should be awarded it's fees. 
Sometime in September, 2000, Whipple's attorney submitted Amended Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law and an Amended Order of Foreclosure as directed by the 
trial court in the Memorandum Decision. The trial court signed the amended pleadings 
which were filed with the clerk of the court on October 18, 2000. On November 17, 
2000, the Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal in relationship to the trial court's failure to 
award the Defendants their reasonable attorney fees incurred in successfully defending 
against the lien foreclosure proceeding in this action. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS: For purposes of this appeal Whipple 
respectfully submits the following as being relevant for this appeal3: 
1. On March 18, 1999, the Utah Court of Appeals entered an order remanding 
3
 A detailed summary of the underlying facts in this case are set forth fully in A.K. & R. 
Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Const., 977 P.2d 518 (Utah App. 1999), a copy of which 
is included as Appendix "5." Addendum "5"to Defendants' Brief of Appellant. 
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this matter to the trial court for disposition of the matter consistent with its opinion 
stating: 
^[31 The Utah mechanics' lien statute provides "in any 
action brought to enforce any lien under this chapter 
the successful party shall be entitled to recover 
reasonable attorneys' fee, to be fixed by the court, 
which shall be taxed as costs in the action." Utah 
Code Ann. §38-1-18 (1997). In this case, although the 
trial court initially granted Aspen's motion to dismiss 
the HVAC portion of Whipple's mechanics' lien claim 
because of improper licensure, it went on to award 
Whipple the value of the work performed on Aspen's 
property. Based in part on this finding, the trial court 
concluded that Whipple was the prevailing party and 
entitled to an award of attorney fees. However, this 
conclusion may be erroneous in light of our 
determination that §58-55-604 precludes Whipple 
from recovering for its HVAC work. Based upon our 
review of the record, it appears the HVAC claim was 
the single most important issue in this case and Aspen, 
having fully prevailed on the HVAC claim in this 
appeal, may now be entitled to prevailing party status 
under §38-1-18. If on remand the trial court 
determines Aspen is the prevailing party under §38-1-
18, then Aspen must be given the opportunity to 
present evidence regarding attorney fees incurred in 
pursuing its claim. We therefore remand this issue to 
the trial court for a redetermination of the attorney 
fees award consistent with this opinion and the entry 
of findings necessary to support the revised award. 
[Emphasis supplied by the Appellant.] (p. 525) A. K. & 
R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr.% 977 
P.2d 518, cert, denied, 994 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1999). 
Shortly after the remand, the trial court held a telephone conference with the attorneys 
and set deadlines to submit memoranda as to the remaining issues identified by the Court 
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of Appeals for resolution by the trial court. (Telephone Conference with Judge Noel 
held September 13, 1999.) 
2. On November 2, 1999, the Defendants submitted their Memorandum of Law 
and Affidavit of Attorney's Fees which detailed the dates the work was performed, the 
hourly rate, the time spent, and described in detail the nature of the services performed. 
Additionally, the Defendants' attorney allocated the fees between: (1) the successful 
claims for which there may have been entitlement to fees; (2) the unsuccessful claims for 
which there would have been a claim for fees had the claims been successful; and (3) the 
claims for which there would be no entitlement to attorney's fees. (Defendants' 
Attorney's Affidavit - Record 1975). 
3. The trial court held a hearing on November 10, 1999, in Salt Lake City. The 
court heard arguments and took evidence from the Defendants' attorney (by way of 
affidavit) as to the reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the Defendants. Whipple's 
attorney argued at the hearing that he could not allocate the fees, but after the hearing 
submitted his affidavit supporting his claim for attorney's fees. (Record 2062, Transcript 
of Hearing, Salt Lake City, Utah, November 10, 1999; Letter and Affidavit of Plaintiff s 
Attorney filed November 12, 1999-two days following the hearing; see also Defendants' 
Objection to the late submission filed November 17, 1999.) 
4. On January 20, 2000, the trial court entered its memorandum decision as to 
the remaining issues. The trial court denied Whipple's claim for relief of foreclosure of 
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the $30,647.20 mechanics' lien and entered a judgment against Whipple in the amount 
of $527.00. (Record 2022) The initial appeal and subsequent remand involved three (3) 
separate lien foreclosure matters which were consolidated for trial.4 The trial court held 
for Whipple on the other two (2) lien foreclosure matters, determined the lien amounts 
($631.00 and $1,666.00 respectively), found Whipple to be the ''successful party" with 
respect to those liens, determined reasonable attorney fees related to those lien 
foreclosure matters (except as to attorney fees on appeal), and entered orders foreclosing 
the other two parcels of property respectively. (Record 2022) (Those judgments of 
foreclosure have subsequently been paid and satisfied by Defendant Aspen Construction 
(except some nominal costs and additional interest). 
5. After deducting the cost of the HVAC system from Whipple's recovery 
Defendants were entitled to a money judgment against Whipple for $527.00. However, 
because Whipple successfully defended Defendants' Counterclaim for negligence and 
the fact Defendants' recovery was based solely on a legal issue, the Court considered the 
outcome as to the 77 Thaynes Canyon property claim as a draw and therefore declined to 
award either party their reasonable attorney fees. 
6. In September, 2000, the Plaintiff submitted Amended Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and an Amended Order in accordance with the trial court's January 
4
 The three lien foreclosure actions which were consolidated for purposes of trial are 
referenced hereinafter for the convenience of the Court as: (1) the Dianne Quinn lien; (2) the 
Tom Guy Poolhouse lien; and (3) the Thaynes Canyon property lien. 
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20, 2000, Memorandum Decision. These were subsequently signed by the trial court and 
were later entered by the clerk on October 18, 2000. (Record 2029) On November 17, 
2000, the Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal in relationship to the trial court's failure to 
award the Defendant their attorney fees incurred in successfully defending against the 
lien foreclosure proceeding. No cross appeal has been filed by the Plaintiff. (Record 
2050). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Whipple initiated this lawsuit seeking recovery for a significant amount of work 
which he had performed on the three properties which are the subject of this consolidated 
action. Whipple was forced to go to trial on all three properties and was required to put 
on a significant amount of evidence as to all three properties even though it was evident 
during the course of the trial that there was no legitimate defense to Whipple's claims 
relating to the Thomas Guy Poolhouse Property and the Diane Quinn Property. 
At the conclusion of the trial Whipple had won on the merits on all of its 
significant claims and the offsets afforded the Defendants were primarily the result of no 
written agreements relating to the work in question and unfinished work attributable to 
Whipple being discharged from the job by Aspen. The $7,000.00 award for damages 
related to the HVAC system was extremely excessive and unsupported by any evidence 
supporting what the cost of repair would be for the deficiencies identified in the trial 
court's Minute Entry and should have been challenged by Whipple nevertheless, 
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Whipple accepted the result. 
The coup de gras for Whipple was the evisceration of its claims by deletion of the 
HVAC system changing the net money recovery on the 77 Thaynes Canyon property 
from an $8,646.00 recovery in favor of Whipple to a $527.00 recovery in favor of the 
Defendants due to, as the trial court stated, based on a "legal issue." Keep in mind the 
trial court rejected Defendant's claims that the system was flawed and would need to be 
removed at a cost of $25,000.00. The Court found the system to be sound except for 
some minor deficiencies, many of which could be corrected with "fine tuning of the 
system." (See Addendum "3" to Defendants' Brief for Appellants) 
Upon consideration of the foregoing coupled with the recognition that after 
deducting the value of Whipple's successful defense of Defendants' Counterclaim from 
Defendants' net money recovery, it is clear that Whipple is still the "successful party." 
The trial court's analysis of the facts as identified in the record and summarized in 
it's Memorandum Decision carefully analyzes all of the facts of the case and reconciles 
the factors to be considered in an award of attorney fees. Consequently, the trial court's 
decision related to it's attorney fee award is reasonable and does not warrant reversal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS HAVE FAILED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE 
ESTABLISHING AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT 
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Clearly Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18 provides for the award of reasonable 
attorney fees to a successful party in an action to enforce a lien under this chapter, 
however, considering Defendants have failed to marshal any evidence demonstrating that 
the trial court has ruled that attorney fees are not recoverable in this action then 
Defendants' appeal must be denied or this Court must find that Defendants' brief 
demonstrates the trial court's refusal to award attorney fees to either party was patent 
error or an abuse of discretion. In Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998), our 
Supreme Court held: 
"The standard of review on appeal of a trial court's 
award of attorney fees is 'patent error or clear abuse of 
discretion.'" 
Nothing in Defendants' brief suggests the trial court's ruling constituted patent 
error or an abuse of discretion nevertheless in anticipation that this Court determines 
Defendants have marshaled sufficient evidence permitting the review of the trial court's 
decision in the context of an abuse of discretion, standard of review, Whipple will 
respond accordingly. 
In simple terms it is Defendants' claim that because it received a net recovery of 
$527.00 related to the 77 Thaynes Canyon property it is the successful party to this 
lawsuit and thus entitled to its attorney fees in the amount of $30,902.89 and the trial 
court's failure to award Defendants their fees is in contravention of this Court's directive 
as contained in its opinion rendered in A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing and Heating v. 
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Aspen Construction, 977 P.2d 518 (Utah 1999). Defendants' argument is flawed in two 
respects, first, the trial court has broad discretion in determining what constitutes 
reasonable attorney fees and so long as the trial court's analysis comports with the 
criteria set down for the award of such fees the trial court's award should not be 
disturbed and second, under a complete analysis of the outcome of this action Whipple is 
the successful party. 
POINT II 
WHIPPLE IS THE SUCCESSFUL PARTY 
As noted in the previous briefs filed by both parties, this was a trial that took place 
over a five (5) day period. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court entered its 
judgment which was appealed and after remand the trial court made the necessary 
adjustments as ordered by this Court in its opinion rendered in A.K. & R. Whipple, 977 
P.2d 518 (Utah 1999). The trial court's modified order is set forth in Addendum 4 to 
Defendants' Brief of Appellants at Page 4. 
As noted, the trial court's breakdown omits any inclusion of the result of 
Whipple's successful defense of Defendants' Counterclaim of $25,000.00 although in its 
discussion the trial court does refer to the disposition of this claim (see Page 5 of 
Addendum 4). The fallacy of Defendants' analysis is its failure to factor in and offset the 
value of this claim to all claims. Upon so doing, it is evident that the net advantage is 
Whipples and it is only after the inclusion of this amount that a true and accurate picture 
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of the outcome is obtained for the purposes of determining successful party status. The 
complete analysis of all claims is as follows: 
1. Water and sewer laterals from curb to house $3,200.00 
2. Plumbing ($14,158.00 less $2,000.00 for offsets) $12,158.00 
3. Gas line $1,015.00 
4. Backhoe $100.00 
5. Water and sewer laterals from the street to the curb $7,000.00 
6. HVAC $12,265.00 contract price less $3,092.00 
to finish $9.173.00 
TOTAL DUE WHIPPLE $32,646.00 
AMOUNT PAID BY DEFENDANTS: - $17,000.00 
Offset for damages based on deficient work - $7,000.00 
TOTAL DUE WHIPPLE $8,646.00 
Less contract price per Court of Appeals - $9,173.00 
TOTAL DUE DEFENDANTS ($527.00) 
Whipple's successful defense of Defendants' 
Counterclaim in the amount of $25,000.00 $25,000.00 
NET ADVANTAGE 
FOR WHIPPLE $24,473.00 
As noted above when factoring in Whipple's successful defense of Defendants' 
Counterclaim Whipple is clearly the successful party even though the final judgment 
resulted in Defendant being awarded a nominal amount of money damages and Whipple 
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receiving no award of money damages. Such analysis is the appropriate way to ascertain 
successful party status. In Brown v. Richards, 840 P.2d 143 (Utah. App. 1992), this 
Court held as follows: 
"...It is the determination of culpability, not the amount 
of damages, that determines who is the prevailing 
party." See Highland Constr. Co. v. Stevenson, 636 
P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah 1981). 
Accordingly, under a complete and accurate analysis of the outcome of all claims in this 
action Whipple prevails and is entitled to successful party status. 
POINT III 
ATTORNEY'S FEES MUST BE REASONABLE 
Our Supreme Court held in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, (Utah 
1988), that the calculation of reasonable attorney fees is in the sound discretion of the 
trial court and will not be overturned in the absence of a showing of a clear abuse of 
discretion and while the Court acknowledged there was no set formula which controlled 
the determination of a reasonable fee, the Court did establish a framework of questions to 
be answered by the Court in assessing the reasonableness of an attorney fee award. The 
Court held as follows: 
"While it is clear that trial court's enjoy broad 
discretion in evaluating evidence to determine what 
constitutes a reasonable fee, there is little Utah law 
providing practical guidelines for this determination. 
(FN6) A brief discussion of earlier cases that have 
listed factors the trial court should consider in 
determining a reasonable fee is fundamental to our 
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analysis in the present case. In Wallace v. Build. Inc., 
16 Utah.2d 401, 402 P.2d 699 (1965), this Court 
explained that what constitutes a reasonable fee is not 
necessarily controlled by any set formula. 16 Utah 2d 
at 405, 402 P.2d at 701. We stated: "What is 
reasonable depends upon a number of factors, the 
amount in controversy, the extent of services rendered 
and other factors which the trial court is in an 
advantaged position to judge." 
In Travner v. Cushing, 688 P.2d 856 (Utah 1984), 
this Court enlarged the list of potential factors by 
including "the relationship of the fee to the amount 
recovered, the novelty and difficulty of the issues 
involved, the overall result achieved and the necessity 
of initiating a lawsuit to vindicate the rights under the 
contract." Id. at 858 (citing Turtle Management, Inc. 
v. Haggis Management Inc.. 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah 
1982)). 
Finally, in Cabrera v. CottrelL 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 
1983), which contains our most detailed analysis of 
attorney's fees to date, the Court added: 
the difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency of the 
attorneys in presenting the case, the reasonableness 
of the number of hours spent on the case, the fee 
customarily charged in the locality for similar 
services, the amount involved in the case and the 
result attained, and the expertise and experience of 
the attorneys involved. 
Id. at 625. The trial court may also take into 
account the provision in the Code of Professional 
Responsibility which specifies the elements that 
should be considered in *990 setting reasonable 
attorney's fees. (FN7) Id. at 624. 
[3] Although all of the above factors may be 
explicitly considered in determining a reasonable fee, 
as a practical matter the trial court should find answers 
to four questions: 
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1. What legal work was actually performed? (FN8) 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably 
necessary to adequately prosecute the matter? (FN9) 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with the 
rates customarily charged in the locality for similar 
services? (FN 10) 
4. Are there circumstances which require 
consideration of additional factors, including those 
listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility? 
Upon review of the trial court's decision relative to the issue of attorney fees, it is clear 
that the Court considered all of the factors identified in Dixie. Set forth hereafter is a 
reconciliation of the trial court's analysis as contained in its Memorandum Decision 
(Addendum to Brief of Appellant) with the factors set forth in Dixie. 
DIXIE CRITERIA TRIAL COURT'S ANALYSIS 
1. What legal work was actually Both parties submitted affidavits 
performed? (FN8) of attorney fees. 
2. How much of the work performed 
was reasonably necessary to 
adequately prosecute the matter? (FN9) 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent 
with the rates customarily charged in 
the locality for similar services? (FN 10) 
(Defendant's Attorney's Affidavit-
Record 1975; Affidavit of Plaintiff s 
Attorney-Record 2062; and Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 4a) 
The parties' affidavits broke down 
the work performed as to each claim 
in their respective affidavits. 
Both parties stipulated at trial to the 
necessity and reasonableness of each 
party's attorney fees affidavit. 
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4. Are there circumstances which require The trial court considered the following 
consideration of additional factors, factors as well: 
including those listed in the Code of (a) Relationship of the fee to the 
Professional Responsibility? amount recovered. 
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the 
issues and litigation. 
(c) The overall result achieved. 
(d) The amount involved in the 
case and the result obtained. 
See Addendum 4 to Defendants' Brief. 
Clearly the trial court's analysis more than addresses the factors set forth in Dixie 
and therefore demonstrates that the trial court's decision to not award either party its 
attorney fees was reasonable under the facts of this case and not patent error or a clear 
abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court never construed Utah Code Annotated §38-1-18 as denying the 
successful party to an action brought under this chapter the right to recover its attorney 
fees, only that based upon its analysis of the facts considered in the context of prevailing 
case law, neither Defendants or Whipple should be awarded its fees. Consequently, the 
standard of review of the trial court's decision is patent error or clear abuse of discretion 
and in light of Defendants' failure to marshal any evidence or even allege an abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court, their appeal must be denied. However, if this 
court determines that Defendants have marshaled adequate evidence for a review of the 
trial court's decision on the basis of an abuse of discretion standard, Whipple maintains 
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that the trial court's decision passes muster when analyzed in the context of the criteria 
established for determining the reasonableness of an attorney fee award as outlined in 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, (Utah 1988) and its progeny. Accordingly, 
Whipple contends that there is no basis to find an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
trial court in its decision not to award either party its attorney fees. 
In addition to the foregoing Whipple has established that it was the successful 
party when factoring in its successful defense of Defendant's Counterclaim in the 
amount of $25,000.00. Upon offsetting this amount against Defendant's net money 
award of $527.00, Whipple has a net advantage in the amount of $24,473.00. While 
Whipple received no monetary award for its success of this claim the value in relation to 
the total claims of both parties cannot be ignored or segregated out and must necessarily 
be considered and factored in when determining successful party status. As noted in the 
discussion supra it is the determination of culpability not the amount of money damages 
that determines the prevailing party therefore even under a net recovery analysis Whipple 
is the prevailing party. 
The Court of Appeals should deny Defendants' appeal and remand this case back 
to the trial court with instructions to award Whipple its attorney fees related to its 
successful defense of the claims asserted by Defendants in the initial appeal related to the 
Thomas Guy Poolhouse property and the Diane Quinn property and to award Whipple its 
attorney fees related to this appeal. 
17 
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DATED this /(9 day of July, 2001. 
Respectfully submitted, 
-< * . 
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Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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